The family is a central, multi-faceted concept in far-right thought. In its heteronormative, autochthonous form, it is seen as one of the fundamental pillars of society and plays a key role in the preservation and transmission of far-right ideology. It is understood not just as a place for handing down far-right values to future generations but also as the antithesis of a state that interferes excessively in private matters, particularly when it comes to education. It is both a refuge where traditional values can be defended against social change, and a safety net against the imaginary ‘Great Replacement' of cultures. Far-right narratives, which contrast the ‘native' population's falling birth rate with the supposedly high birth rate among immigrant families or the proliferation of different family structures, such as rainbow families, fit into a racist agenda that presents these phenomena as a threat to national and ethnic survival. This illustrates how closely intertwined far-right politics are with family policy agendas, as well as how social discourse around the family has increasingly been shaped by the far-right in recent decades.
Taking the example of the Austrian Identitarian movement and its successor organization, Die Österreicher, I look at contemporary discourse around the family within a modernized far-right group. The two Telegram channels belonging to Martin Sellner, the former leader of the Identitarians (Martin Sellner / [Telegramelite] and Martin Sellner – Videos & Audioanalysen), are particularly representative of this discursive movement, as are the self-descriptions and the five-point programme set out on the Die Österreicher website, and texts that are no longer available online from identitarian forums, vlogs by the movement's cadres and activists, and political messages from actions and campaigns.
My analysis shows that familialism – understood as a political stance that sees the heterosexual, patriarchal, nuclear family as the fundamental unit of society – unsurprisingly plays a key role in far-right ideologies. As well as serving as an identitarian reference point, these ideologies also structure narratives of societal decline and legitimize the far-right's proposed political measures and supposed solutions. The rhetoric of scandal and crisis allows far-right actors to represent the family as simultaneously under threat and as the source of salvation. Narratives around the family can also be easily attached to other political agendas, such as racism or queerphobia. While groups like the Identitarians have modernized their ideology and language in other areas, for example by rebranding racism as ‘ethnopluralism' or antifeminism as the defence of women's rights, their concept of the family has not seen a comparable update. If nothing else, this demonstrates the central importance of the white, patriarchal family as a cultural talisman against social changes related to modernization and (neo)liberalism.
The family as nucleus and bridge
As early Identitarian texts make clear, the family functions in their ideology as the ‘nucleus of any community' and as a link between the individual and the ‘people': ‘The people is to the family what the family is to the individual: the next level up in the hierarchy of community and kinship.' The phrase ‘from the family via the community to the people' illustrates the far-right understanding of the family as the fundamental social unit, supported by the community and perfected in the ‘people.' The idea of the ‘people' is conceived as a homogenous national and ethnic unit that must be protected against external influences. This hierarchy aims to preserve ethnic and cultural identity by means of traditional structures. As Andresen observes: ‘“We†and others: the image of the strong nuclear family is used to flesh out the idea of a united “Weâ€, the idea of the homogenous people, a homogenous community. It is also the antithesis of the individualistic, modern person living in globalized society.'
In political terms, this translates into measures to encourage traditional family structures as well as pro-nationalist policies for preserving ethnic homogeneity. Against this background, it is hardly surprising that the term ‘family' is used exclusively in connection with white, European families in our selected corpus of texts (although they only allude implicitly to this line of discourse). The families of refugees or migrants are either absent or depicted as dangerous tribes.
The family as victim
The family also features in the construction of scenarios of threat and fear, in which autochthonous families are depicted as the victims of ‘multiculturalism,' the ‘globohomo agenda' or supposedly misdirected family policies. Focusing particularly on children, both Die Österreicher and Martin Sellner emphasize how much families would suffer under the imagined ‘Great Replacement', with white children in the minority in schools and their parents living in fear of attacks by offenders labelled as ‘foreigners'. ‘Because of this horror, fewer and fewer German people want to have children and families. That makes everything worse,' writes Sellner, who also claims that he was happy his first child was a boy because he could teach him to defend himself. In his view, people who can defend themselves are not victims. Die Österreicher are above all concerned about the situation in schools: ‘Austrian children are mostly in the minority and are subject to constant harassment and bullying. Particularly during Ramadan, they experience religious pressure: anyone who eats or drinks during the day is soon humiliated by the entire class. Austrian girls and girls who do not wear headscarves are regarded as “infidel slutsâ€'. This forces families ‘to send their children to expensive private schools or to move out of cities. But this is expensive and not an option for some people due to professional or financial circumstances'.
These quotes exemplify the attempt to fabricate threat scenarios and to link family policy with racist narratives. Because many people perceive the challenges currently facing schools (overcrowded classrooms and a high proportion of children with limited German language skills) to be a problem, reference to the supposed threats facing families is an effective narrative tool, offering ‘access to various social contexts and discourse arenas'. Die Österreicher do not just name the culprits but also offer apparently simple (racist) solutions.
The destruction of the family through ‘re-education'
The family also plays an important role at the intersection of family, children and childrearing. This is particularly clear in the rejection of educational content that promotes sexual and social diversity, as shown by attacks on children's book readings by drag queens. Concepts from gender research and equal opportunities policies are presented as a threat to the ‘natural order' of family and gender and undermined by loaded terms like ‘gender mania' and ‘the sexualization of children'. These are coupled with accusations of ‘re-education' and ‘indoctrination', often in connection with demands for the primacy of parental rights. Die Österreicher and Martin Sellner both participated in mobilizations against children's book readings by drag queens, and Sellner's Telegram channel contains content addressing the same issue. For example, in a post linking to an Instagram video featuring schoolchildren with rainbow flags, he rails against ‘rainbow propaganda in schools': ‘Imagine how the leftist press would howl if anyone tried that with national flags or patriotic songs and motifs. Then it would be “indoctrinationâ€. But in the new globohomo religion everything is allowed.'
In an audio commentary discussing the protection of children against LGBTQIA+ discourses, Sellner answers a supporter's request ‘for specific ideas for how people can protect their own children against indoctrination in schools.' His 16-minute answer suggests that the best approach is ‘proactive non-preparation'. He believes it is better not to tell children about diverse lifestyles and sexualities because it makes them feel ‘insecure'. When LGBTQIA+ symbols or topics come up, parents should simply say, ‘It's nonsense, end of story.' He also describes his plans for educating his own son: ‘I will tell my son from a very early age that the rainbow is something evil, bad and ugly.' He claims that this approach helps children develop a protective shield so that ‘teachers find it harder to indoctrinate them'.
Although Sellner's audio commentary mentions the risk that these feelings of insecurity could leave children unable to start their own families, it does not claim that educating children about LGBTQIA+ issues would destroy existing families. This can be explained partly by the audio clip's focus on children, but also by the fact that in recent years the discourse around threats to children has been much more effective than that of the destruction of families. As Meike Sophia Baader highlights, the narrative of threatened children offers ‘opportunities for mobilization against sexual diversity and for homophobia and a new, antifeminist familialism.'
The family as the antithesis of neoliberal individualism
In our source texts the family appears as an ideologically charged antithesis to the social isolation caused by modernization and (neo)liberalism. In his review of Edgar von Cramm's book Die Zerstörung der Menschheit, Sellner describes the tension between ‘natural reproduction', technological progress and state regulation. He contrasts a ‘free play of forces' with supposedly artificial state interference in reproduction and connects the latter to terms like ‘eugenics' or Sloterdijk's ‘human zoo'. Sellner claims that modern developments have led to a loss of ‘naturalness' and destroyed family structures, with technological progress and secular lifestyles being the primary culprits. To combat this trend, he encourages strict regulations around marriage and a return to a supposedly ‘natural order' in order to motivate the ‘right' people to reproduce.
The family as heroic saviour
Older Identitarian texts display their pro-natalist stance particularly clearly, for example when they claim that women can prevent the so-called ‘Great Replacement' by having more children. ‘Child- and family-friendly policies' must include recognition of the ‘achievements of mothers', who ‘ensure the continued existence of our people in the future'. In far-right circles, the family is regarded as a weapon in the demographic war. High birth rates are needed to grow the autochthonous population so as to outdo other groups in sheer numbers.
The Identitarians also bring the falling birth rate into their campaign against the ‘Great Replacement': ‘Due to the low birth rate among Austrians, the native population shrinks every year. And yet the overall population continues to grow.' Their campaign website features a graph that fits into the narrative of ‘fertile immigrant women': it compares the birth rate of mothers born in Austria with that of those born in Turkey. With 2.4 children per woman, the latter had a significantly higher rate than Austrian-born mothers, with 1.38.
Sellner sticks to this line of argument in his audio commentary ‘Einwanderung verhindert deutsche Geburten,' (Immigration prevents German births) in which he claims that the birth rate is below one among the autochthonous population, but much higher among families with a history of migration. In the introduction to the commentary, he laments the lack of attention paid to the impact of ‘replacement migration' on native births: ‘Over-foreignization is the most effective contraceptive for European children'. His proposed solutions focus on rewards for autochthonous families that have numerous children, such as tax reliefs, ‘Austrian schools' and other benefits. He also suggests that starting a family should be rewarded. However, the salvation narrative seems to have become less prominent in recent years or at least it no longer features in more recent sources.
The family in conflict with activism
At the same time, however, there is also critical engagement with the idea of the family as an obstacle to political activism. In one of Sellner's first vlogs, he explores the relationship between activism and the family. He asserts that while having children and valuing one's family are inherently good things, social change cannot be brought about through private decisions: it would not be enough for all patriots to have 20 children. Having children is not a political act, but merely a drop in the ocean. He worries that many activists will experience a short, intense ‘burst of activism', only to retreat into the ‘safe harbour of marriage' and lead a middle-class life – a prediction that proved right in subsequent years. In a video posted on Telegram to mark his thirtyfourth birthday at the beginning of 2023, Sellner himself announced that his ‘activism' phase was coming to an end. He said he did not want to be a ‘lifelong teenager' or an ‘old codger' and would instead focus in future on the online ‘information war'. And he does indeed seem to be doing so, as evidenced by his activity on Telegram and other social networks and his audio commentaries.
Far-right terminologies in mainstream discourses
Far-right actors' recourse to and exploitation of the family fulfils several functions: it helps to construct fear and threat scenarios directed against migration and immigration, gender and sexual diversity, and modernization and neoliberal individualism. At the same time, the family serves as a blank surface for the projection of supposed (racist) solutions to the challenges facing society. Familialism, understood as a political stance that sees the family as the central, fundamental unit of society and connects it to the protection of tradition and culture, thus plays a key role in far-right ideology.
As Meyer observes, ‘the retreat to the ideologically mapped-out terrain of education, family and gender promises to create order, security and control in the private sphere, which the rhetoric of crisis has already constructed as being under threat.' This framing of family policy allows the far- right not just to address a wide range of social issues but also to shore up their ideological foundations. The rhetoric of crisis implicitly supports traditional gender roles and creates a sharp divide between the national ‘we' and the foreign ‘others'. Family, childhood and gender serve as ‘organizing categories' with which to protect existing power relations. Right-wing groups position the family as a bulwark against political liberalism and social modernization, and use it to project anti-emancipatory, racist, anti-LGBTQIA+ and nationalist ideological stances.
Overall, the far- right has not substantially modernized its concept of the family. Although many aspects of its ideological communications have been adapted, for example through the use of digital media, language that appeals to young people or strategic rhetoric, actors like the Identitarians, Die Österreicher or Martin Sellner continue to cling to a rigid, traditional image of the family. They may update their language to align with contemporary debates on migration, sex education, and LGBTQIA+ rights or book readings by drag queens, but the ideological core of the conservative model of the family remains untouched: their ideal family is strictly heteronormative, biologically determined and hierarchically structured.
While the Austrian Identitarians have not gained significant ground in terms of membership numbers in recent years, the terminologies they have developed like ‘remigration' and ‘population exchange' have entered public discourse and are increasingly used. This is arguably more concerning in the covert discursive and ideological shifts it triggers in the wider population. As such, their understanding of familialism has the potential to reach beyond the confines of their immediate far-right ‘community' and to affect public discourse more broadly.
Â
This article is published with the support of the ZEIT-Stiftung Ebelin und Gerd Bucerius.
